Let's face it...we deal with security in a very reactive way, and we often end up with some real progress on the security front, along with some very real screwups.
I want to step back to 9/11 for a moment. It is vivid and clear in most (if not all of our minds). After the 9/11 attacks happened, we witnessed a time when our government had a lot of power (and most of it remains today) to do almost anything they wanted to do in the name of securing our nation. For the first time in my life I witnessed a Congress the passed sweeping laws that created a somewhat muted police state, cloaked as "The Patriot Act". Those that chose to defy our leaders were labeled as miscreants (in some cases), or told that they were being unpatriotic.
Some things that came out of 9/11 were pretty good. Locking of cockpit doors is one of them. Another is a heightened sense of awareness by airline passengers, who are not likely to sit idly as terrorists attempt to mess around on an airplane.
Other things...not so much.
Anyone who travels today must now be subject to the circus we know as the security line at any major airport, which is a barricade often manned by everything from well experienced and concientious agents, to agents that find their absolute power quite satisfying, and not in a good way. We are forced to relinquish event the tiniest pocket knife, but are permitted to carry our laptops on the plane, which has a glass screen that could easily be broken, leaving us with a razor sharp length of glass that could do far more damage in the hands of a would be terrorist. There have been instances of agents who have become so attentive of water bottles, that they miss handguns in carryon items. Elderly people in wheelchairs are often forced to go through lengthy searches, and in at least one case I have personally witnessed several agents taking someone out of a wheelchair who could not stand up, and forcing him to go through a search while he totters on the brink of falling.
One would hope, after more than a decade of dealing with security issues post 9/11, that we would be better at this than we are, and I certainly do not feel more secure. I am simply more annoyed. I don't fear terrorists at the airport. I fear TSA agents who routinely search checked bags, and sometimes steal the contents. I saw a story last week about a TSA agent who routinely stole iPads out of checked bags. The TSA response was something like "We are looking into it." Try as you will, but you are not likely to win an argument or case against the TSA. They are, after all, supremely powerful in this day and age.
This brings me to the issue of medical device security. I am seeing a lot of news stories lately where our government is being pressured to do something about medical device security. Without question, it is an issue that has to be addressed. The FDA is currently being pressed upon to act on cybersecurity issues, and it remains challenging, to say the least.
We face a situation today where Congress is likely to require the FDA to take a more active role in cyber security, and I am concerned that if this is done in a reactive and hurried manner, we face the possibility of overreaction. Cyber security is not complicated, but it is a constant learning process that requires immersion to fully understand. The FDA is currently one very busy agency, and in my conversations with the FDA, I have discovered that they are very challenged in keeping up with the workload they are presently facing, which would lead me to conclude that they are going to be very challenged in properly consider all the nuances of any cyber security decisions they may be forced to make. As someone who has worked with (and continues to work with ) medical device manufacturers, I have learned that patient safety, reliability of therapies, and ease of use are of utmost importance to manufacturers and patients alike, and decisions made about how to implement security must be tested to the nth degree before proceeding with implementation. Congress must understand that if anything is mandated, there will indeed be manufacturers who will focus more on compliance over creating a security culture, and what the FDA (and Congress) should focus on is first understanding what a security culture should look like, and how the risk profile changes with any security related decision made by a device manufacturer.
It is important to understand that, as a traveller, I often have alternatives to dealing with air travel, and the repercussions of the inconvenience are generally limited to a specific instance (a trip). The repercussions of bad decisions made on the medical device front are far more serious in nature.
I am off my soapbox.
Wednesday, June 6, 2012
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Ethical Hacking, Health Care, and Irrationality
As a security professional, I am often intrigued and frequently fascinated by some of the clever things that security researchers come up with. I remember hearing of one presentation where a researcher was able to tunnel into a laser printer that was exposed to the internet, and stop a print job, causing the paper to catch fire in the fuser (at least I believe that is how he did it).
Another interesting discussion I was made aware of was someone who could remotely access cars parked in a parking lot and set off the car alarms. Very clever indeed.
Another researcher showed how he could attack an ATM and get it to spit out cash. Fascinating!
The fact is that people who build these devices and add features that allow creative ways to access them build them for functional purposes. The functionality is complex enough to build, so it is not very likely that they consider non-functional uses of such devices when building them. Even if they did, someone is likely to give them some blank stares and furrowed brows if they spend too much engineering time considering how not to use the device.
This, of course, is completely at odds with the way security researchers (hackers, if you will) look at things. They do not spend much time looking at what makes something work, but instead on what makes it not work...or work in a way that was not intended by the designer. As luck would have it (for the hackers), there are literally infinite possibilities in the non-functional world.
This, of course, leads to a lot of ways to potentially entertain and certainly alarm more than a few people. In many cases, there are ways to mitigate some of the risk associated with these findings. In the case of the laser printer, simply segregating the network is fairly straightforward. With ATMs, we can always go back to tellers (until we find a fix). We can always disable the network features of automobiles as well. These "fixes" may inconvenience us, but at least they do not diminish our quality of life in any major way. As humans, we cope well.
From an ethical persecutive, one can argue that the work of security researchers is completely necessary to move secure design and development forward. Let's face it...good security happens in a reactive manner close to 100% of the time. Going back to my earlier point, engineers are primarily tasked with building functionality into products. There are ways to do it with security built in from the ground up, but we are still a long way from getting the engineering world to embrace that. We will eventually get there, but not likely until the public consciousness is raised.
Nonetheless, I had the opportunity to review an excellent document recently titled "The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles Guiding Information and Communication Technology Research" (http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/MenloPrinciplesCORE-20110915-r560.pdf) which "...proposes a framework for ethical guidelines for computer and information security research, based on the principles set forth in the 1979 Belmont Report, a seminal guide for ethical research in the biomedical and behavioral sciences." This report really hit home with me, and I want to explain why, but first let me tell you a couple of stories.
I want to start with a story about flu shots. Back in the 1980s I worked at a resort in Florida and one day I heard that a nice old chap who was one of the dock masters had gone to his doctor for a flu shot (his first ever) and had an allergic reaction to the vaccine, went into anaphylactic shock, and died.
Wow!!!
That sealed the deal for me. Despite all the prodding I had gotten from those around me as I grew older, I decided that there was no way I was going to get a flu shot. I mean...c'mon...I DON'T WANT TO DIE OF AN ALLERGIC REACTION!
This sat well with me for many years...until I got the mother of all flu attacks in 2004. I remember laying in bed in sheer misery for two weeks, first fearing that I was going to die of all the pain and inability to breathe...and then, towards the end, almost wishing I would just die. Let me tell you, a cold is NOT the flu. I have had bad colds, and this was the flu, and it was utter HELL.
It occurred to me, once I was feeling better again, that the one instance in my entire life of anyone having a severe reaction to the flu vaccine was not a rational justification for that two weeks of misery, which was likely to happen (and perhaps even kill me as I got older) again. I certainly like to think of myself as being intelligent, but I have a way of rationalizing things to suit my purpose outside of global empirical information...and sometimes it bites me in the you know what.
What is perhaps even more alarming is that, prior to my awakening to the benefits of vaccination, I almost prevented my first child from getting vaccinated because of all the hysteria surrounding alleged incidences of autism from vaccinations. Were it not for the calm and patient persuasion of the vaccination nurse at the local medical center, who explained to me that the likelihood of devastating childhood maladies was indeed quite high for my baby if he did not get vaccinated, I may have exposed him to several diseases that came back in the last decade (namely polio and whooping cough), no doubt at least in part from the irrational fears brought about by vaccination naysayers.
Fear and uncertainty has a way of getting us to do things outside of the realm of reason at times. It is the essence of propaganda, marketing hype, and political circuses. After watching "Jaws" in the 1970s it was not until I had spent over a decade living in Florida, where the waters are literally thick with sharks, that I realized that the likelihood of getting attacked by a shark was FAR smaller than the likelihood of getting skin cancer...which several of my Florida friends and associates did contract. Media hysteria and Hollywood stunts have a way of tugging at our hearts and warping reality...indeed they do.
So this brings me back to the point I am trying to make (and thank you for being patient). Lately, there have been more than a few media-rich and Hollywood-like stunts portraying some of the dangers of security flaws found in medical devices, and this is simply not sitting well with me. Unlike printers, ATMs, and automobiles, medical devices are currently causing patients that need them to experience a much better quality of life than they would have without them...and in many cases they are keeping them alive. If one looks at sections C 3, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of the aforementioned report, some very salient points emerge:
C 3 Beneficience
"...the Beneficence principle reflects the concept of appropriately balancing probable harm and likelihood of enhanced welfare resulting from the research. Translating this principle to ICTR demands a framework for systematic identification of risks and benefits for a range of stakeholders, diligent analysis of how harms are minimized and benefits are maximized, preemptive planning to mitigate any realized harms..."
C 3.1 Identification of Potential Benefits and Harms
"...researchers should identify benefits and potential harms from the research for all relevant stakeholders, including society as a whole, based on objective, generally accepted facts or studies..."
"...One helpful approach to identifying harms is to review the laws and regulations that apply to an ICTR activity, and analyze the underlying individual and public interests that the research might negatively impact..."
"Because laws may be unclear or open to interpretation, a narrow focus that only considers acts impacting the integrity or availability of information and information systems might overlook a broader range of harms that may not be explicitly protected by law."
C 3.2 Balancing Risks and Benefits
"...the researcher should systematically assess risks and benefits across all stakeholders. Researchers should be mindful that risks to subjects are being weighed against the benefit to society, not to to either the research subjects or the researchers themselves. Researcher actions should be measured using a standard of a reasonable researcher, who exercises the knowledge, skills, attention, and judgment that the community requires of its members to protect their interests and the interests of others.
When ICT is involved, burdens and risks can extend beyond “the human subject,” making the quantification of potential harm more difficult than with direct intervention. It can be difficult to balance risks and benefits with novel research whose value may be speculative or delayed, or whose realized harm may be perceived differently across stakeholders. If there are plausible risks, researchers bear the burden of showing specific, evidence-based consideration that they can manage those risks."
C 3.3 Mitigation of Realized Harms
"Despite appropriate precautions and attempts to balance risks and benefits in ICTR, research may cause unintended side effects that harm stakeholders."
Please understand that I have taken excerpts out of the report, and I expect the reader of this blog posting to look at the entire article.
The point should be relatively clear by now. The work of security researchers is invaluable, but prior to the hacking of medical devices, the societal risks have not hit home quite at the level they are now. The fact is that any patient who chooses to minimize their risk of having their device hacked as a result of the media hype is likely to make a decision that is likely to cause them far greater harm than the likelihood of the device being criminally hacked.
It is my hope that security researchers delving into medical device hacking take this under serious consideration, because (as Peter Parker - The Amazing Spiderman's uncle once said) with great knowledge comes great responsibility.
Another interesting discussion I was made aware of was someone who could remotely access cars parked in a parking lot and set off the car alarms. Very clever indeed.
Another researcher showed how he could attack an ATM and get it to spit out cash. Fascinating!
The fact is that people who build these devices and add features that allow creative ways to access them build them for functional purposes. The functionality is complex enough to build, so it is not very likely that they consider non-functional uses of such devices when building them. Even if they did, someone is likely to give them some blank stares and furrowed brows if they spend too much engineering time considering how not to use the device.
This, of course, is completely at odds with the way security researchers (hackers, if you will) look at things. They do not spend much time looking at what makes something work, but instead on what makes it not work...or work in a way that was not intended by the designer. As luck would have it (for the hackers), there are literally infinite possibilities in the non-functional world.
This, of course, leads to a lot of ways to potentially entertain and certainly alarm more than a few people. In many cases, there are ways to mitigate some of the risk associated with these findings. In the case of the laser printer, simply segregating the network is fairly straightforward. With ATMs, we can always go back to tellers (until we find a fix). We can always disable the network features of automobiles as well. These "fixes" may inconvenience us, but at least they do not diminish our quality of life in any major way. As humans, we cope well.
From an ethical persecutive, one can argue that the work of security researchers is completely necessary to move secure design and development forward. Let's face it...good security happens in a reactive manner close to 100% of the time. Going back to my earlier point, engineers are primarily tasked with building functionality into products. There are ways to do it with security built in from the ground up, but we are still a long way from getting the engineering world to embrace that. We will eventually get there, but not likely until the public consciousness is raised.
Nonetheless, I had the opportunity to review an excellent document recently titled "The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles Guiding Information and Communication Technology Research" (http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/MenloPrinciplesCORE-20110915-r560.pdf) which "...proposes a framework for ethical guidelines for computer and information security research, based on the principles set forth in the 1979 Belmont Report, a seminal guide for ethical research in the biomedical and behavioral sciences." This report really hit home with me, and I want to explain why, but first let me tell you a couple of stories.
I want to start with a story about flu shots. Back in the 1980s I worked at a resort in Florida and one day I heard that a nice old chap who was one of the dock masters had gone to his doctor for a flu shot (his first ever) and had an allergic reaction to the vaccine, went into anaphylactic shock, and died.
Wow!!!
That sealed the deal for me. Despite all the prodding I had gotten from those around me as I grew older, I decided that there was no way I was going to get a flu shot. I mean...c'mon...I DON'T WANT TO DIE OF AN ALLERGIC REACTION!
This sat well with me for many years...until I got the mother of all flu attacks in 2004. I remember laying in bed in sheer misery for two weeks, first fearing that I was going to die of all the pain and inability to breathe...and then, towards the end, almost wishing I would just die. Let me tell you, a cold is NOT the flu. I have had bad colds, and this was the flu, and it was utter HELL.
It occurred to me, once I was feeling better again, that the one instance in my entire life of anyone having a severe reaction to the flu vaccine was not a rational justification for that two weeks of misery, which was likely to happen (and perhaps even kill me as I got older) again. I certainly like to think of myself as being intelligent, but I have a way of rationalizing things to suit my purpose outside of global empirical information...and sometimes it bites me in the you know what.
What is perhaps even more alarming is that, prior to my awakening to the benefits of vaccination, I almost prevented my first child from getting vaccinated because of all the hysteria surrounding alleged incidences of autism from vaccinations. Were it not for the calm and patient persuasion of the vaccination nurse at the local medical center, who explained to me that the likelihood of devastating childhood maladies was indeed quite high for my baby if he did not get vaccinated, I may have exposed him to several diseases that came back in the last decade (namely polio and whooping cough), no doubt at least in part from the irrational fears brought about by vaccination naysayers.
Fear and uncertainty has a way of getting us to do things outside of the realm of reason at times. It is the essence of propaganda, marketing hype, and political circuses. After watching "Jaws" in the 1970s it was not until I had spent over a decade living in Florida, where the waters are literally thick with sharks, that I realized that the likelihood of getting attacked by a shark was FAR smaller than the likelihood of getting skin cancer...which several of my Florida friends and associates did contract. Media hysteria and Hollywood stunts have a way of tugging at our hearts and warping reality...indeed they do.
So this brings me back to the point I am trying to make (and thank you for being patient). Lately, there have been more than a few media-rich and Hollywood-like stunts portraying some of the dangers of security flaws found in medical devices, and this is simply not sitting well with me. Unlike printers, ATMs, and automobiles, medical devices are currently causing patients that need them to experience a much better quality of life than they would have without them...and in many cases they are keeping them alive. If one looks at sections C 3, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of the aforementioned report, some very salient points emerge:
C 3 Beneficience
"...the Beneficence principle reflects the concept of appropriately balancing probable harm and likelihood of enhanced welfare resulting from the research. Translating this principle to ICTR demands a framework for systematic identification of risks and benefits for a range of stakeholders, diligent analysis of how harms are minimized and benefits are maximized, preemptive planning to mitigate any realized harms..."
C 3.1 Identification of Potential Benefits and Harms
"...researchers should identify benefits and potential harms from the research for all relevant stakeholders, including society as a whole, based on objective, generally accepted facts or studies..."
"...One helpful approach to identifying harms is to review the laws and regulations that apply to an ICTR activity, and analyze the underlying individual and public interests that the research might negatively impact..."
"Because laws may be unclear or open to interpretation, a narrow focus that only considers acts impacting the integrity or availability of information and information systems might overlook a broader range of harms that may not be explicitly protected by law."
C 3.2 Balancing Risks and Benefits
"...the researcher should systematically assess risks and benefits across all stakeholders. Researchers should be mindful that risks to subjects are being weighed against the benefit to society, not to to either the research subjects or the researchers themselves. Researcher actions should be measured using a standard of a reasonable researcher, who exercises the knowledge, skills, attention, and judgment that the community requires of its members to protect their interests and the interests of others.
When ICT is involved, burdens and risks can extend beyond “the human subject,” making the quantification of potential harm more difficult than with direct intervention. It can be difficult to balance risks and benefits with novel research whose value may be speculative or delayed, or whose realized harm may be perceived differently across stakeholders. If there are plausible risks, researchers bear the burden of showing specific, evidence-based consideration that they can manage those risks."
C 3.3 Mitigation of Realized Harms
"Despite appropriate precautions and attempts to balance risks and benefits in ICTR, research may cause unintended side effects that harm stakeholders."
Please understand that I have taken excerpts out of the report, and I expect the reader of this blog posting to look at the entire article.
The point should be relatively clear by now. The work of security researchers is invaluable, but prior to the hacking of medical devices, the societal risks have not hit home quite at the level they are now. The fact is that any patient who chooses to minimize their risk of having their device hacked as a result of the media hype is likely to make a decision that is likely to cause them far greater harm than the likelihood of the device being criminally hacked.
It is my hope that security researchers delving into medical device hacking take this under serious consideration, because (as Peter Parker - The Amazing Spiderman's uncle once said) with great knowledge comes great responsibility.
Friday, February 10, 2012
First Smart Grid Documentary Ever !
It's an interesting ride...so hang on!
I am fascinated by reality much more than I am fascinated by anything in the world of fantasy. I mean, think about it for a moment. In my life I have watched us go from phones with rotary dials and coiled cords that always got bizarrely tangled, tethered to walls via mysterious outlets, to handheld computers that allow you to place video calls, and allow you to have conversations with them as they reply to your commands with a sexy voice.
It seems like humans are capable of building anything if they see a need for it to be built, and that is the most fascinating story ever told...and it has been told many times in all of our lives, and as far as time goes back.
We all build things...create things if you will...for our own reasons, or for those who employ us. It seems to me that the most interesting things built are built by those who driven by a desire to make something great, or make something better, and not necessarily for a paycheck.
Don't get me wrong...a paycheck is nice, and definitely a necessity in life, but it is rarely the driver to those who want to build great things. What drives people to build great things is the human need to prove to themselves (and others) that they can create great things, or make other things better.
It's a fascinating story to watch unfold, if you will take the time to discover it. If you like your iPhone, you really should get yourself a copy of Steve Job's biography, and understand what drove him to create the device that literally changed the way we consume information, navigate, and communicate.
Besides reading books, my favorite way of consuming these fascinating tales of how things came to be as they are today is through watching documentaries...and lot's of them. I remember the first time I discovered that through Netflix streaming services I could watch literally hundreds of documentaries on nearly as many topics...and so I did (much to the behest of my small children). It seems like I cannot get enough of them. There are so many interesting stories to be told, and the documentarians seem to do a fine job of getting past the hype, marketing spin, and myths surrounding so many subjects worth exploring.
So let's fast forward to my security conference. Back in 2010 my company was hired by a company (a silicon vendor) to produce a whitepaper that outlined the Smart Grid security landscape. I dove right in, as I normally do, and attempted to capture the essence of the Smart Grid as quickly as I could. What I soon discovered is that, although the Smart Grid was rapidly evolving, our understanding of the Smart Grid was changing with every passing moment. The issue of Smart Grid security was particularly challenging to grasp, since the topic is very sensitive in nature to most, and those involved in the Smart Grid security ecosystem still had a lot to learn. While I discovered pockets of knowledge here and there (e.g. NIST, OpenSG, DHS ICSJWG), there was no place I could go to truly immerse myself in the dialogue that I felt needed to happen. There were lots of Smart Grid conferences out there, but they covered the topic of Smart Grid security at a very minimal level at best. There were also lots of security conferences out there, but Smart Grid was only a tiny portion of the event. I felt that we needed a Smart Grid security event, and created the first Smart Grid security conference that I knew of in the United States. I was shocked to have around 100 people show up for the first event, and it led to two more after that (and my 4th event is coming up at www.GridSec.com, which is focused on not only Smart Grid, but also energy infrastructure security).
As someone who was working within the ecosystem, I was able to bring in some great speakers, and gain the trust and support of some very key players. I always sought to evolve the conference as the industry evolved, and decided that the next event (upcoming March 27-29 in Irving, Texas) should involve people at the CxO level, and went on a quest to find at least one utility CxO who would speak on the sensitive topic of security. I have to say, it was a lofty goal and was not easy, but persistence pays off, and I was put in touch with Dave Hallquist, the CEO of the Vermont Electric Cooperative, who agreed to speak. That, in and of itself, was absolutely fantastic.
What happened next (a few days later) became even more interesting. Dave's son, Derek Hallquist, is a documentary film maker, and contacted me asking if he could film his father at my upcoming conference, since he had partnered with documentary film producer Aaron Woolf (of "King Corn" fame), and they were going to follow Dave Hallquist around the country as he went from conference to conference interacting with people in the Smart Grid world. It was to be the first Smart Grid documentary ever created, and they planned to submit it to the Sundance Film Festival.
Needless to say, I was flabbergasted. Not only was the story of the Smart Grid going to be told in a documentary (and we are still in the very early stages of the Smart Grid), but it was going to break ground at my conference.
This has, of course, unleashed a storm of interest and support from everyone I know in the industry. Utilities are all thrilled, vendors are all thrilled, and all those who have helped me make this happen are all thrilled. I was wondering when a Smart Grid documentary was going to come to fruition.
...now I know.
I am fascinated by reality much more than I am fascinated by anything in the world of fantasy. I mean, think about it for a moment. In my life I have watched us go from phones with rotary dials and coiled cords that always got bizarrely tangled, tethered to walls via mysterious outlets, to handheld computers that allow you to place video calls, and allow you to have conversations with them as they reply to your commands with a sexy voice.
It seems like humans are capable of building anything if they see a need for it to be built, and that is the most fascinating story ever told...and it has been told many times in all of our lives, and as far as time goes back.
We all build things...create things if you will...for our own reasons, or for those who employ us. It seems to me that the most interesting things built are built by those who driven by a desire to make something great, or make something better, and not necessarily for a paycheck.
Don't get me wrong...a paycheck is nice, and definitely a necessity in life, but it is rarely the driver to those who want to build great things. What drives people to build great things is the human need to prove to themselves (and others) that they can create great things, or make other things better.
It's a fascinating story to watch unfold, if you will take the time to discover it. If you like your iPhone, you really should get yourself a copy of Steve Job's biography, and understand what drove him to create the device that literally changed the way we consume information, navigate, and communicate.
Besides reading books, my favorite way of consuming these fascinating tales of how things came to be as they are today is through watching documentaries...and lot's of them. I remember the first time I discovered that through Netflix streaming services I could watch literally hundreds of documentaries on nearly as many topics...and so I did (much to the behest of my small children). It seems like I cannot get enough of them. There are so many interesting stories to be told, and the documentarians seem to do a fine job of getting past the hype, marketing spin, and myths surrounding so many subjects worth exploring.
So let's fast forward to my security conference. Back in 2010 my company was hired by a company (a silicon vendor) to produce a whitepaper that outlined the Smart Grid security landscape. I dove right in, as I normally do, and attempted to capture the essence of the Smart Grid as quickly as I could. What I soon discovered is that, although the Smart Grid was rapidly evolving, our understanding of the Smart Grid was changing with every passing moment. The issue of Smart Grid security was particularly challenging to grasp, since the topic is very sensitive in nature to most, and those involved in the Smart Grid security ecosystem still had a lot to learn. While I discovered pockets of knowledge here and there (e.g. NIST, OpenSG, DHS ICSJWG), there was no place I could go to truly immerse myself in the dialogue that I felt needed to happen. There were lots of Smart Grid conferences out there, but they covered the topic of Smart Grid security at a very minimal level at best. There were also lots of security conferences out there, but Smart Grid was only a tiny portion of the event. I felt that we needed a Smart Grid security event, and created the first Smart Grid security conference that I knew of in the United States. I was shocked to have around 100 people show up for the first event, and it led to two more after that (and my 4th event is coming up at www.GridSec.com, which is focused on not only Smart Grid, but also energy infrastructure security).
As someone who was working within the ecosystem, I was able to bring in some great speakers, and gain the trust and support of some very key players. I always sought to evolve the conference as the industry evolved, and decided that the next event (upcoming March 27-29 in Irving, Texas) should involve people at the CxO level, and went on a quest to find at least one utility CxO who would speak on the sensitive topic of security. I have to say, it was a lofty goal and was not easy, but persistence pays off, and I was put in touch with Dave Hallquist, the CEO of the Vermont Electric Cooperative, who agreed to speak. That, in and of itself, was absolutely fantastic.
What happened next (a few days later) became even more interesting. Dave's son, Derek Hallquist, is a documentary film maker, and contacted me asking if he could film his father at my upcoming conference, since he had partnered with documentary film producer Aaron Woolf (of "King Corn" fame), and they were going to follow Dave Hallquist around the country as he went from conference to conference interacting with people in the Smart Grid world. It was to be the first Smart Grid documentary ever created, and they planned to submit it to the Sundance Film Festival.
Needless to say, I was flabbergasted. Not only was the story of the Smart Grid going to be told in a documentary (and we are still in the very early stages of the Smart Grid), but it was going to break ground at my conference.
This has, of course, unleashed a storm of interest and support from everyone I know in the industry. Utilities are all thrilled, vendors are all thrilled, and all those who have helped me make this happen are all thrilled. I was wondering when a Smart Grid documentary was going to come to fruition.
...now I know.
Please Attend This Seminal Event!
Sign Up At www.GridSec.com
Monday, December 5, 2011
Humbled By The Outpouring Of Support
This past week I discovered that an article I submitted to the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) Journal had been selected for publication, and made the cover. Although I am part of the editorial board (the shark tank, as we call it), I submitted it anonymously, and made the cut. Needless to say, I was thrilled.
The article was about medical device security, and I have a Google Alert set up for medical device security. The day after my article was published, I saw a Google Alert that pointed to an article with a similar title. My article is called "Oh, Hackable You!" and the similarly titled article was "The Hackable You." Interesting.
When I went to the website, I realized that the author of the article had, quite literally, completely plagiarized my article. He changed the introduction a bit, copied and pasted the entire rest of the article WORD FOR WORD, and then changed the conclusion a bit. It was obvious and willful fraud, and I was livid.
I immediately posted this on my Twitter feed, and what happened next truly reminded me why I absolutely love working with the information security community. My dear friend Travis Goodspeed (who has over 2700 followers) re-tweeted it and then embarked on a quest to find out more about this person, who, as it turns out, is a serial plagiarist. He quickly discovered that dozens of members of the infosec world had been plagiarized by this person, and let them all know that this had happened, which unleashed a Twitter storm like nothing I had ever witnessed. Within hours the organization he works for had pulled the blog, issued a public apology, and called me (and at least one of the other writers) and personally apologized for the incident(s).
What amazes me about the information security community is that it has evolved into a very tight brotherhood, independent of any "official" regulatory body. Every member of the community is charged with the duty of policing even other member, and NOBODY gets a pass go. Anyone who tries to enter the infosec world and attempt to sell snake oil is immediately smacked down by the community. It took me years of hard work to get to the point in my career where the community accepted me as one of their own, and I have to say that I am completely overwhelmed by the support, and knowledge that by brothers (and sisters) in the information security world are there for me...and I for them.
Thank you!
The article was about medical device security, and I have a Google Alert set up for medical device security. The day after my article was published, I saw a Google Alert that pointed to an article with a similar title. My article is called "Oh, Hackable You!" and the similarly titled article was "The Hackable You." Interesting.
When I went to the website, I realized that the author of the article had, quite literally, completely plagiarized my article. He changed the introduction a bit, copied and pasted the entire rest of the article WORD FOR WORD, and then changed the conclusion a bit. It was obvious and willful fraud, and I was livid.
I immediately posted this on my Twitter feed, and what happened next truly reminded me why I absolutely love working with the information security community. My dear friend Travis Goodspeed (who has over 2700 followers) re-tweeted it and then embarked on a quest to find out more about this person, who, as it turns out, is a serial plagiarist. He quickly discovered that dozens of members of the infosec world had been plagiarized by this person, and let them all know that this had happened, which unleashed a Twitter storm like nothing I had ever witnessed. Within hours the organization he works for had pulled the blog, issued a public apology, and called me (and at least one of the other writers) and personally apologized for the incident(s).
What amazes me about the information security community is that it has evolved into a very tight brotherhood, independent of any "official" regulatory body. Every member of the community is charged with the duty of policing even other member, and NOBODY gets a pass go. Anyone who tries to enter the infosec world and attempt to sell snake oil is immediately smacked down by the community. It took me years of hard work to get to the point in my career where the community accepted me as one of their own, and I have to say that I am completely overwhelmed by the support, and knowledge that by brothers (and sisters) in the information security world are there for me...and I for them.
Thank you!
Saturday, November 5, 2011
The SCADA Within Us
I have been saying this for quite some time now, and I was absolutely thrilled when someone from the health care industry came up to me and said "We are running SCADA systems in health care." For those who do not know what the acronym stands for, it is "Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition".
Let's examine this for a moment.
Supervisory - Medical systems are indeed used to supervise patients. That is exactly what they do.
Control - Medical systems are indeed used to control patient procedures at many levels. That is exactly what they do.
Data Acquisition - Medical systems record patient data constantly, and use this information to make decisions. That is exactly what they do.
Yup! They are SCADA systems.
I just returned from the Amphion Medical Forum in Minneapolis, home of Medtronic (the largest medical technology company in the world). Medtronic is very concerned with medical device security, and they are now beginning to understand the potential impact of mounting interest among the attack sector in hacking SCADA systems. Rest assured they are taking this VERY seriously, and this is an absolutely fantastic bit of news for the health care community, because they are the most likely organization to make an impact on health care security. I applaud Medtronic executives for their decision to aggressively address these issues.
One of the most interesting discussions I had with a member of the Medtronic engineering staff, who seemed very familiar with SCADA systems, was the very unique challenges the medical device industry is facing. One challenge is that they cannot easily address physical security of many medical devices, since they are frequently found in patients (e.g. insulin pumps, pacemakers) or in their homes (e.g. monitors). While it is possible to educate patients about this, it is nearly impossible to control physical security. Another issue is that, even if devices are designed with firmware that can be updated, there is no easy way to update the firmware in devices implanted in the human body, and for several reasons. One obvious reason is...well...because it is implanted in a human body. Another reason is because many of these devices operate on coin sized batteries, and many of you know that firmware updated dramatically decrease battery life. Let's not forget, by the way, that a failed firmware update on an implanted device that puts it in a DOS state is also very serious.
On the subject of power, if you think that the "traditional" SCADA systems have resource constraints, you are not even close to the resource constraints of some of these medical devices. Let's not forget the need for reliability as well.
The health care industry is taking this very seriously, but there are some major challenges to address...and this is very high priority.
Health care touches each and every life on Earth. I look forward to working with the health care industry to get this under control.
Let's examine this for a moment.
Supervisory - Medical systems are indeed used to supervise patients. That is exactly what they do.
Control - Medical systems are indeed used to control patient procedures at many levels. That is exactly what they do.
Data Acquisition - Medical systems record patient data constantly, and use this information to make decisions. That is exactly what they do.
Yup! They are SCADA systems.
I just returned from the Amphion Medical Forum in Minneapolis, home of Medtronic (the largest medical technology company in the world). Medtronic is very concerned with medical device security, and they are now beginning to understand the potential impact of mounting interest among the attack sector in hacking SCADA systems. Rest assured they are taking this VERY seriously, and this is an absolutely fantastic bit of news for the health care community, because they are the most likely organization to make an impact on health care security. I applaud Medtronic executives for their decision to aggressively address these issues.
One of the most interesting discussions I had with a member of the Medtronic engineering staff, who seemed very familiar with SCADA systems, was the very unique challenges the medical device industry is facing. One challenge is that they cannot easily address physical security of many medical devices, since they are frequently found in patients (e.g. insulin pumps, pacemakers) or in their homes (e.g. monitors). While it is possible to educate patients about this, it is nearly impossible to control physical security. Another issue is that, even if devices are designed with firmware that can be updated, there is no easy way to update the firmware in devices implanted in the human body, and for several reasons. One obvious reason is...well...because it is implanted in a human body. Another reason is because many of these devices operate on coin sized batteries, and many of you know that firmware updated dramatically decrease battery life. Let's not forget, by the way, that a failed firmware update on an implanted device that puts it in a DOS state is also very serious.
On the subject of power, if you think that the "traditional" SCADA systems have resource constraints, you are not even close to the resource constraints of some of these medical devices. Let's not forget the need for reliability as well.
The health care industry is taking this very seriously, but there are some major challenges to address...and this is very high priority.
Health care touches each and every life on Earth. I look forward to working with the health care industry to get this under control.
Friday, October 14, 2011
What We Really Want Is A Hot Meal, Good Health, And Electricity
Those of you that know me are perhaps aware that I have have spent large portions of my life working in 3 somewhat distinct areas: Food Service, Health Care Security, and Smart Grid Security. All 3 disciplines have taught me a few things that I carry with me every day.
I am no longer in the Food Service industry...thank God! If any of you have ever watched Hell's Kitchen on TV, trust me...it is not far from reality. Working in high technology means better pay, less heavy lifting, and weekends and holidays off (more or less).
Still, I learned some things in the Food Service industry that serve as valuable lessons to this very day. One thing I learned is that regardless of how hard you work, you are inevitably judged for the last good (or bad) deed you accomplished, often irrespective of your history. Memories are short, and you always have an opportunity to either redeem yourself, or fall flat on your face. The choice is yours.
Another thing I learned about the Food Service industry is that they have 2 objectives:
I am no longer in the Food Service industry...thank God! If any of you have ever watched Hell's Kitchen on TV, trust me...it is not far from reality. Working in high technology means better pay, less heavy lifting, and weekends and holidays off (more or less).
Still, I learned some things in the Food Service industry that serve as valuable lessons to this very day. One thing I learned is that regardless of how hard you work, you are inevitably judged for the last good (or bad) deed you accomplished, often irrespective of your history. Memories are short, and you always have an opportunity to either redeem yourself, or fall flat on your face. The choice is yours.
Another thing I learned about the Food Service industry is that they have 2 objectives:
- Make Food
- Get Paid For The Food
Hey! What can I say? I am nothing if I am not perceptive.
As it turns out, this carries over into both the Health Care and Energy industries. The Health Care industry wants to deliver health and get paid for it. The Energy industry wants to deliver energy and get paid for it.
We can apply this logic to just about any industry we choose, as it turns out :-)
Okay, so I am here to talk about security. What does all of this have to do with security?
As it turns out, security is essentially about safety (or perhaps safety is really about security). The two go hand in hand...and perhaps can be conflated in some (if not all) cases.
So let's go back to my life in foodservice for a moment. Having spent many years working as a chef in restaurants, I noticed a few things about safety that were recurring themes. One was that every single restaurant I worked in had a fire safety system installed by a competent installer, and (most importantly), the fires safety system itself was built by a competent manufacturer. After this was done, the fire inspector would perform an inspection and make sure it satisfied the requirements for fire safety, and the fire inspector would periodically return to make sure all was in order. Eventually, we saw the arrival of the National Fire Protection Association's Certified Fire Protection Specialist Certification Program, which is ANSI accredited. Additionally, UL has a program in place for approval of fire safety systems (e.g. sprinklers) in use today.
Having worked in a restaurant where the fire safety system has triggered, I have to admit that it is very effective. However, in retrospect, the fact that I find most interesting is that not one restaurant, hotel, or resort (and I worked for some big resorts) had any staff on board who was responsible for the design, implementation, and maintenance of the fire safety system.
They simply hired someone to put on in, got it inspected, and then went on with the business of making and serving food. I have to say, it works splendidly.
Imagine that!
So let's take this back to the Health Care and Energy industries for a moment. We need to understand that what we have to do in the security world is get to that point where health care and utility staffs can focus as much of their time as possible on delivering what they are in the business of delivering. We are currently living in an environment where we have place nearly all the burden for securing health care and energy systems on those who are ill suited for the job. Sure, they are getting better...by hiring staff to help get them up to speed, and reaching out to professionals, but is this necessarily the desired end state.
I fully realize that the food service industry is not saddled with the enormous burden of protecting their network stack from intrusion, and that no level of cyber attack is likely to mess with the integrity of their signature dish covered with delicious Béarnaise sauce. Yet the threat of fire is very real, generally quite devastating, and ever present. Nonetheless, we have managed to create a management system that is both extremely effective and extraordinarily simple to live with.
...and let's look at the health care industry for a moment.
We are all familiar with the FDA (the Food and Drug Administration). Hospitals use health care equipment and use drugs that are FDA approved...and absolutely do not use any health care equipment or drugs that are not FDA approved. Okay...at least they better not...or face stiff fines and immediate shutdown (believe me, the FDA is hardcore about their rules). Although it is a US organization, FDA approval is so highly regarded globally that most nations accept FDA approval as a "green light" for use in their own countries. Health care providers do not have to manage staff to ascertain the safety in using FDA approved products. They simply stick with the FDA approved products and (ostensibly) use them to deliver good health care.
I fully believe that we will eventually come to terms with cyber security issues, as we have come to terms with fire, and as we have come to terms with "snake oil" health care solutions of the past. As Paul Kocher of Cryptography Research indicate during his excellent keynote at my Smart Grid Security Summit this past month, security today is still struggling with the same "snake oil" issues that health care had to deal with in the past. As we continue to move forward with addressing cyber security issues, we all need to keep in mind that a lot of what we hear is going to be "snake oil", and we should look towards how other safety issues have been addressed in the past, and perhaps learn some valuable lessons.
Okay...now I'm hungry.
Monday, October 10, 2011
Upcoming Event: Amphion Medical Forum
I have been invited to moderate a panel at the Amphion Medical Forum on November 3rd, 2011 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This fantastic event features security experts who specialize in studying, understanding, testing, and addressing security issues related to connected medical devices.
What you may or may not know is that nearly every piece of medical equipment that collects and records data today (heart monitors, X-Ray machines, MRIs, IV Monitors...and the list goes on and on) has a communications stack of some built in, or will have one soon. Recent demonstrations at Blackhat, for example, have re-awakened our consciousness to the seriousness of security issues surrounding medical devices (if this attack in 2008 was not enough).
If this is of interest to you, join me at the Amphion Medical Forum on November 3rd, where you will have an opportunity to listen to some of the most brilliant minds in the world of medical device security, as well as meet them face to face.
Oh...and by the way...IT'S FREE !
See you there!
Mike Ahmadi
P.S. To guarantee yourself an invitation, use priority code "GraniteKey"
What you may or may not know is that nearly every piece of medical equipment that collects and records data today (heart monitors, X-Ray machines, MRIs, IV Monitors...and the list goes on and on) has a communications stack of some built in, or will have one soon. Recent demonstrations at Blackhat, for example, have re-awakened our consciousness to the seriousness of security issues surrounding medical devices (if this attack in 2008 was not enough).
If this is of interest to you, join me at the Amphion Medical Forum on November 3rd, where you will have an opportunity to listen to some of the most brilliant minds in the world of medical device security, as well as meet them face to face.
Oh...and by the way...IT'S FREE !
See you there!
Mike Ahmadi
P.S. To guarantee yourself an invitation, use priority code "GraniteKey"
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)